An existentialist’s knowledge theory

Knowledge theory in existentialism

— Mystical-existential participationism ¹ —

Mystical participationism is no satori for the vulgar. In contradistinction with satori, in the state of mystical participation to existence there’s no feeling one would possess the whole world as a property; it is not the ego he who generates the world, but it is the unconscious. If one is seriously sticking to the New Age, only if one is stupid can miss satori, but this state of profound egoism is not the purpose of the individual existence, this is clear from New Age’s fruits, which, proposing a liberal democratic mysticism to the world (in its thelemic essence), does not contribute in building a civilization, but to the destruction of the existent ones.

When we look, we don’t perceive the eye, but the tree we look at. We can know the world only if we are in the world, and the world can know us only if the world is in us. We interact with the world because we have the same substance as it (on a same vibration level). Or, we can interact with world only if we are pieces of it. The hand can lift the pencil because it touches it. The same way, the soul sees the pencil because the soul touches the pencil. The spirit, in its turn, it can operate with the idea because it touches the idea.

We supposed that both the physical body as well as the soul and the spirit, they are each a body. Their substance may be considered as kind of an aggregation of vibrations, as well as an elementary particle can be seen as an anaphor, a whirl formed on the flow of the river following a pillar.

This idea (existential monism) can be easily proven. We start with the premise that God is Spirit (John 4:24). We will prove first the lemma that the Universe is at the same time mental and real. Between the knower (soul, person) and the material things which he/she perceives, there are knowledge relations being established, links by which the things are perceived. If these links are neither ideal nor real, then the knowledge is the fruit of nothingness, so we would be in pure nihilism. Absurd, because the only substance of nihilism is the nothing, which, in its turn, it exists, so we are able to infer from the existence of the nothing, the existence of the principle of the existence: the to be (i.e. what enables the nothing to be).

If the links would be ideal but not real, then they could not establish the link between the observer and the objects. Between the links and the objects would then there are some other links, and so on, recursively, to infinity, again absurd, because we maintain that we can know something about the world.

If the links are real but not ideal, we ask: how do they reach the knower? Further we apply the argument of the previous sentence.

We are left with the only possibility, which is that the links are at the same time mental and real. A possibility inside it is that there are four types of substances:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Real substance (R)</th>
<th>Mental and real substance (MR)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nothing (N)</td>
<td>Mental substance (M)</td>
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This idea is developed in the empirical idealism of Rudolf Steiner, which saw the soul as dual something (we say: a dual substance) between the spirit and the body, the same way, to the antipode of this idea, in the solution of water and alcohol floats a drop of oil.

This conception creates and irreducible opposition between the ego and its environment, opposition which, in contact with the superior knowledge, it generates inflation. A more sane alternative is the monism, which Steiner adopted ontologically, but not in its gnoseologic
or:
What Heidegger’s being-with and being-in-the-world are all about?

and

Making sense of Jung’s panpsychism

consequences. (A complete proof of the subsistence of the mental is to be found in Heidegger’s Being and time, §44.a., wherein Plato’s gigantomachia peri tes ousias is cut as a Gordian knot.)

In order to exemplify the monist idea, we have to think of a drop out of the ocean. The water molecule is the physical body of a human; the drop is his/her soul; the quantity of water the drop can access forms a bucket of water, which is human’s spirit.

On Venn-Euler diagrams we have: the existence – a rectangle, spirit – the big circle; soul – the medial circle and physical body – the little circle.

Of course, we are keeping some of Steiner’s idea, i.e. the level separation between the vibration level of the spirit, soul and physical body. But, we attribute these vibrations to a unique substance which vibrates, from zero (the nothing) till plus infinity (God Himself). For, in order to explain the presence of four essentially different substances we would need four gods, and not One, which is absurd, for they would no longer fulfill the criterion of totality.

Strawson stumbled upon the definition of the soul, but he just went further unabated:


Above, Strawson affirms that one’s own existence is his/her soul. Therefore, the soul means the life (the living) of reality, as manifested in a person. To such a life of reality corresponds a reality of life, i.e. the ontological subsistence of the soul, and its afterlife, as shown by Iordanescu at http://members.home.nl/tgeorgescu/thesoul.html.

2 Jung affirms, in principle, that everything a human perceives, he/she perceives as psychical images, therefore that the human does not access any existence outside his/her own psyche, and even when he/she is talking about extra-psychoical existences, he/she does it from inside his/her own psyche.

In regard of panpsychism as philosophy, the same way as the same air or landscape (evidently for a soul, for without souls being there, there would be no talk about landscapes), these can be in darkness or in light, as well as this there can be a lower and higher awareness. Even the elementary particles are endowed with soul, but they are not aware of themselves, but they are subordinated to human’s awareness.
For what is a man profited, if he shall gain
the whole world, and lose his own soul? or
what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?

Matthew 16:26

Here we shall answer two questions: “Am I able to perceive my soul?” and
“Am I able to perceive his/her soul?”.

Premise: a human is no isolated monad (thus a being wholly void of inputs
and outputs, i.e. perceptions⁴ and actions⁵), but he/she exists (consciously or
unconsciously) in the manner of participatio mystica (participation means to establish
a common being, a communion, and mystic means what can be described, but not
explained in its cause⁶ – the term is borrowed from Lévy-Bruhl).

The material chair is an elemental (psychical being emanated by a living being) materialized.
This elemental organizes the souls of the elementary particles from which the object chair is composed.
The chair, as idea, is an egregore (leading spirit of elementals), and such an egregore inspired
the mind of the humans which made the material chairs.

The participative “we”, not the impersonal one!

Perception: being aware of a state, as reported by the five (or more) senses, e.g. that the
painting hangs oblique.

Action: modifying a state, e.g. changing the position of the painting. These two definitions
(perception and action) imply to some extent circularity. But, Heidegger showed in his Origin of the
Artwork that circularity is not vicious per se. In fact any judgment is circular if it is judged deep
enough (as its ground following from its consequences). The opinion that circularity should be avoided
at any cost is a naïve opinion, which pertains to the beginnings but not to the later evolution of logic.

Here the term mystical is used for two purposes. Firstly, it belongs to the traditional view
expressed by Lévy-Bruhl that the primitives would be more prone to mysticism than the moderns.
Quite often the modern views mysticism as some contagious germ of superstitions, which would more
properly belong to the dark ages. What this view ignores is that the whole tradition of thinking
originates in mystical speculation, i.e. it begins with Parmenides, Heraclites and Plato. These giants’
formalizations of the existence are, according to Heidegger the source of all subsequent logics and way
of perceiving our environment, which we call reality.

Secondly, the term is used to underline a view which, though readily available to reason and
its criticism, originates in the study of the exoteric occult doctrines. We have to understand the term
occult in its broader meaning, as revealed in Hebrews 11:1 as “hidden”. We understand thus that any
discussion which goes beyond the quantification of experimentality, it properly belongs to this
meaning, and more specifically that “Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of
things not seen” Hebrews 11:1 implies that Christianity is in essence an occult (mystical) doctrine.
Also it affirms as certain the existence of substance.

The cause of participationism can be well explained as the pantheistic monism, which is
proper to existence. Our demarche is belonging to the use of reason subsequent to such a mystical
doctrine as above. May it be noted that the common connotation of irrationality, which is believed as
belonging to mysticism, is partly due to the improper furthering of mysticism, on one hand, and to the
functary incompetence in understanding an argument in rational formatting, on the other hand. True,
reason is not the only knowledge source of the mystic (reason even taken together with his senses,
which provide it with sensorial input). His progress is also based on intuition, magic life and revelation,
as well as on some authority (by which he receives the revelations). Gadamer offered in Truth and
Method the grounds why Enlightenment's radical rationalism fails to support the knowledge required
by the social life.
The first consequence of such a premise is that there are no subject and object, structured out of phase as in Descartes’ conception, but the two, they function consubstantially, although on different vibration levels. By “subject” we understand the world of a man, without splitting it (from the beginning) in an external and an internal world, anyway not the way Descartes did split it. As we perceive the monitor, this is automatically part of our internal world (for it is a perception, belonging thus to the soul). The only problem is if there’s an external world outside the monitor, a world which makes it function and directs its behavior. We agree that such a world does really exist, but, because it is “external”, we have no unfettered access to it, and we can deduce its existence only by putting it in the equation of thinking, which affirms it in its possibility and necessity. From here, the value judgment that the existentialism is as far from the idealism’s solipsism as it is far from realism’s impersonalism. The reality of the external world has therefore be rethought from the presence of the perceptions of some objects, to the overwhelming of the to be, as expressed by Heidegger in Introduction in Metaphysics (§ 52).

Cartesianism is an unnatural philosophy, which was born in the spirit of a man obsessed by combating skepticism. The humanity could live thousands of years

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7 The participationism does not cancel the dualism, but it moves this from subject/object to conscious/unconscious. It sees the objects that we perceive as already in the awareness. But: how does something exist inside the awareness? The solipsistic answer that it would produce its own content does not satisfy us, because we exist already together with the others (Heidegger’s Mitsein), but that we ourselves would have invented them, this is an absurdity. The fact we are thrown to exist, i.e. we do not exist according to our own pleasure, and it is a proof that we are servants of another will than our own. And then, through our own existence, we are participants in this will, which imposes us a portion of reality as being our own parcel of garden, which we have to work. We see that the archetypal landmarks of the agrarian civilization hold actual, even if, apparently, they would be superseded by the complexity of our modern life. What is terrible here is the estrangement from these normative landmarks of our existence, alienation that necessarily produces its reactive effects with a compensatory intent. The multiplication of psychic pain is not a sort of divine punishment, but the trial of one’s own soul to recover the contact with its fundamental elements. In this sense, participationism is a fundamentalism, not because it would fanatically believe a dogma, but because it searches for a comeback into the river flow of the psychic fundaments, which not long ago was ensured by the traditional mentality. That we, apprentice wizards of rationality, we found proper to unburden us from these landmarks, this is not a sign of wisdom. What of a more evident proof we search for, than even the throwing overboard of rationality with rational means? Or, this way the necessary consensus needed by coexistence cannot be ensured anymore but by answering with the same coin to power’s provocation by the postmodern mentality. The will for will (be it of one leader) seems to be the only option left while facing nihilism. The prophet of this fallen world is Nietzsche, and he, even, he is a prophet that contributes to its further decay. As well as Descartes, seeking to combat the skepticism, he left us within a retarded effect prey of it, the same way Nietzsche, seeking to combat the nihilism, he felt himself prey to it. Or Nietzsche, according to Jung, is a man completely prey of the unconscious, as well, we can say, Descartes and Kant were men fully fallen prey of the conscious. What is condemnable in them, it is their unilateralism, i.e. the fanatic way in which they adhered intellectually to their own dominant characteristic. Or, sane is always the middle way, which, though Aristotle thought it, he forgot to include it in his logic, which, in its turn, it promoted the black and white vision as the only possible one. From here, soul’s tendency of throwing intellect overboard, for its constructions could not explain the soul dynamic, being therefore regarded as cold, alien and sterile, vision whereupon Nietzsche did excel, and the New Age speculates it upon the masses. The intellect has to answer this provoking and it has to integrate this viewpoint in a vision at the same time superior and affable towards it. Or, this thing it cannot do alone, but only guided by the red wire of the intuition.
without such a philosophy. Our purpose is the recovery on a conscious expression of the original and natural state\(^8\) of mystical participation, denaturized by the imposing of the metaphysics of subjectivity.

The soul looks like\(^9\) (as perceptions in the material plane):

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Reality can therefore be seen as the intention of more wills, beginning with Creator’s Will and ending with the personal one. And, from the fact existence is, we can deduce that it continuously wants to be, wish which it imposes (as obligation) to its parts through all the means it sees fit. As such, the personal pleasure is not the meaning of life, but it is to be found within satisfying superior purposes, purposes that not necessarily have been made public. The Hindus regard sometimes the existence as a kind of game, but such a serious game has all the attributes of the real, so I see no gain in the viewpoint that denies the reality of the world.

Our system, although originating as construction in a monist conception, does nothing else than confirm the pluralism, even more, it explains the unclear concepts of Descartes and Kant, i.e. subject and object. So, we no longer, due to lack of clarity in defining them, reach either the depersonalization of the subject or the solipsism, but we affirm the true values of the notions of subject and object, we think the soul as person, one which participates to the existence of the other persons, and he/she is being exchanging soul substance with them, substance which more often than not he/she owns it shared with the other persons.

\(^8\) We understood here that the way of being of the primitive peoples, taken in its noble characteristics (i.e. the full participation to the social), is the paradisiacal way of being, from it all other subsequent modes of being following as decay.

In this respect testify J.J. Rousseau, with his “le bon sauvage” and R. Steiner with his anthroposophy he maintains, as well as contemporary psychology, that the primitives know no self-identity in the formatting of an ego, thing that he sees as absolutely negative, while Sri Ramana Maharishi denies the “illusion” of individuality. Lucian Blaga speaks about the magical/mythical awareness of the original people. Krishnamurti asks himself on the ways of his excursions of vision upon life if man, in general, would possibly be one with the world. Osho (Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh) maintains the thesis that the humans are part of the existence, thing which should not be taken in its banal meaning, but in the pantheist one, thing which makes us able to understand differently the existentialism of Heidegger (in his idea of shared beingness [beings] required by the communion which makes communication possible). Heidegger describes the way of being of the antique Greeks, noting that they were not under gods in a separating way, but they lived among gods, and they were interacting with them, true that with respect for hierarchical positions. Jung, in his turn, affirms that the modern’s infatuation in respect to the idea of “primitive” has no ground. If we add to this view the image of decay from Daniel chapter 2 (from gold to iron mixed with clay), we can say that the modern man is even inferior to the primitive.

Gadamer is present too with Truth and Method, wherein he offers a presentation of the overwhelming-participationist theory of the game in Huizinga, together with a collection of objections to Cartesianism, Kantian gnoseology and individualism, objections that aspire to the mystical-existentialist participationism, though they do not express it explicitly.

\(^9\) On the ontological argument: the idea of pen precedes the real pen. Anselm wanted to say that the idea of God is simultaneous (even identical) with the reality of God. Hegel took over this reasoning in the form of the Idea that thinks itself, being not only a subjective idea, but also an objective reality. From here we can deduce the answer suggested by Jung in his Answer to Job, i.e. the world is at the same time ideal and real, so we have a monism which unites the opposites “reality” and “idea”. From here it follows that there is no difference of substance between subject and object, but our substance is not the matter of the materialists, but the Spirit which generated the whole existence and fuels it with energy. Another word for “Spirit” is: God. Our existential monism is therefore a divine monism (pantheism). Substance may come from “substantial”, i.e. being endowed with a purpose. Substance is what we commonly understand as existence, i.e. the ensemble of the existences (as included in a sort of
Above the human perceives the tree, because the tree is part of his own soul. On [http://members.home.nl/tgeorgescu/motivations.html](http://members.home.nl/tgeorgescu/motivations.html) and [http://members.home.nl/tgeorgescu/thesoul.html](http://members.home.nl/tgeorgescu/thesoul.html), Lucian Iordanescu has quantitatively analyzed the soul as the combination of four energies: Fohat, Prana, Kundalini and Mana (as emotional body). But, we will analyze the soul in its philosophical structure.

The answer on the question “Am I able to perceive my soul?” is: Yes, without the soul there is no perception; the soul is the body of the perceptions (sensations), feelings and wishes, which, together, produce the emotion. In our knowledge theory exposition, it interests us only its perceptibility and the ability to know the soul. We have thus seen that the whole of our perceptions is part of our soul. Thus, as we perceive something, we perceive in fact our own soul (our own existence, which we share with the “object”).

The problem is that we perceive, but we do not understand. This also holds for the soul of another. In the world of mystical participation, the following scheme is of application (exemplified for three souls):

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Iordanescu mentioned that when a viewer is passionately looking at TV, he is caught in show’s virtual reality even more than he is caught in objectual reality. We can see thus that the human is to be found where the center of his/her attention lies. Heidegger’s Dasein is a here-being, which is also to be found in a proximal there. The idea that (human) existences are part of the existence makes sense of Heidegger’s Being and Time.

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No comrades-objects, but comrades-souls. We participate one to the other, the mistake being the idea that he/she can be manipulated as an object. Descartes, and Kant later, wishing to circumscribe the soul to the idea of objectuality, whereupon the objectivity is based, they transformed it in a thing, true that not in an explicit way, but unconsciously, as implicit vision in analyzing the soul.

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set), by contradistinction with the principle of the existence, which is what confers to it the quality of being a Whole. Christianity is not only compatible with pantheism, but it even presupposes the later, as it is proven by: “For in him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring.” [Acts 17:28](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Acts%2017%3A28&version=NKJV).

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From here (as reaction) the idea, shared by Heidegger and Jung, that the human deserves quite another way of being noticed than the chairs and tables do deserve.

To the world external to itself, the soul has no direct access, but, through the spirit, it can know that that exists and think about what that contains. This process takes place on a mediated way (in the case of a content which originally did not commonly belong to the two souls, so what is the content of another soul and that is lent to it, true that poorer, because the transfer of soul substance is not always a full one, the substance being lent to the soul which receives the loan) be it on an indirect way, i.e. the way of intuition and reasoning (the ensemble of the two we gather under the name thinking). Intuition offers that red wire which thinking follows in all its excursions, otherwise the power of only the reasoning is very poor, because it has to begin from somewhere and tend towards something, and these landmarks do not come out of nothing, but from that which, according to the case, confers thinking the substance or only an appearance of substance (analogous to a soap bubble which is taken by the unknowing one as a solid object, invoking that it is in last instance also made of a substance).

Diethy, according to Gadamer, sought to rethink the subjectivity as relativity. In this meaning, the contents of an existence, they are neither subjective nor objective, but particular, i.e. they possess a lesser degree of generality. We do not ask ourselves any more the question of which is the only correct way, but about whether the personal existences do justify their own content. We pass, as follows, from the normative of the digital casting of being (result of the ideal of objectivity) to a descriptive way, much more proper to the idea of science than the decreeing of a unique way of thinking as the only valid one. Of course, the complementary aspect is also true, i.e. that the society has the right to censor the behavior of its members, which in their turn, they can aspire to modify it. Dreadful hereupon is only the anarchical multiplication of those tendencies to remodel the society, their effect being the lesion of the authority that has to sustain the social plane, as the foundation sustains the house. Through democratization, the participation in the social of society’s members did not really increase, but only virtually; this is through the imposition of a virtuality as criterion of reality. It is clear that millions and millions of people do not lead the society, but they obey the manipulators and they are being convinced that this means to decide.

Speaking of the substance of the soul, this is the image. Nominalist philosophy splits knowledge as coming from two sources: facts and thinking (judgments). This distinction is rather unclear, because we cannot say that a certain physical dog is a dog without having an idea of dog, and also, we cannot have the idea of dog without speaking of instances of the dog. The idea of dog participates in the perception of a dog, as well the individual dog participates to dogness.

Jung equates metaphysical knowledge modalities with constellation. Since metaphysics is the model of sure knowledge per se, we can say that all knowledge comes from constellation. The same way as on the nuclear scale there is indistinctness between wave and particle, there is no clear distinction between the judgment and the fact, for they both are images. Before saying we have either a fact or a judgment, we have an image which relates to other images. The only difference is the level of awareness, since a judgment is a spiritual image, while a fact is mostly an image inside the physical plane (we follow here the unclear idea of nominalism). The being which accesses both types of images is the soul; both fact and judgment meet together inside such a being, as in a vessel with water we pour a drop of blue ink (fact) and a drop of red ink (judgment), and we take from it a drop of liquid for analysis.

But, of course the essence of the liquid, the liquidity and the waterness are still unknown to us, in their ground and in the grounds of such a ground. In order to be able to explain such a process as osmosis, we have to rely on the fundamentals of quantum mechanics, i.e. we have to do foundationist research in this field, since it is not given unto us now as readily available information. Fritjof Capra did an attempt to ground the concept of matter on a quantum mechanical foundationist basis, and the history of philosophy is full of attempts which tried to reduce the real existence to a single term or formula, or to a notion such as matter, substance, emptiness, probability, soul, spirit, God, etc.

But, unaware of how we understand, we are doomed to intellectually rely upon secondary or tertiary groundlessness. Heidegger’s view is being verified here, that thinking consists ultimately in combinations of puzzles, and each puzzle determines a thinker, without being able to say what is there.
Therefore, as participators, we perceive the perceptions and, also, the emotions and the wishes of others. The only problem is that, though we perceive them, we understand them not. The soul of another is thus (partly) a part of our own soul, provided we have a (conscious or unconscious) dialogue, thus a shared existence. But, as we wish to understand the soul of another, and not only participate in it, we must then use our spirit.

One manifestation of the spirit is the analysis and synthesis. Suppose I have ten liters milk. I take glass milk and I describe its content. That is analysis. Synthesis is when I shake the milk till I get one ball butter. Thus, de analysis makes us aware of the fact the milk contains butter, but making butter, that is a purposeful effort. We understand now why\(^ {11} \), while we have direct access to the soul of others, we cannot express them consciously. The mystical participation is in this case our friend and our enemy. It is our friend because we have access to the things we want to know, but it is also our enemy, because we think those things so self-understood, that we do not pay the effort to express them consciously.

\(^{11}\) behind such a puzzle, or what the answer would be to the enigma of a thinker. Therefore, thinking is just a tricky kind of doing mystique, since it relies upon mystery and the unexplainable. Maybe such a line of thought determined Kant’s onto-gnoseologic despair, i.e. his refuse to access the thing in itself. We see that, although tremendous pretensions are there that thinking would have evolved since its beginnings, we are still owing to mysticism and mystery, which only did the trick upon us through hiding themselves under the common understanding called rationality. Heidegger was right: such a ratio was called rationality (which became a cheap way of changing the burden of proof), since the very ground of ratio was missing.

We are not owners of the truth, since we cannot produce truth as we wish (at our own command). Instead, poor monkeys, all we can produce is at our pleasure is the lie. There are many theories about existence, yet they generalize each a particular truth. The only abuse here is saying such theories are complete and universal. Instead, they belong to the personalities of those who thought them as particular fleas belong to a particular dog. Of course, its complementary excess, which says there is no truth and all we can say is being relative, this is as pernicious as the former, since spirit needs truths as the eyes need the light.

The required effort is not being spent.
Thus, the answer on the second question is: Yes, we have an unconscious access to the soul of another, but in order to perceive it consciously, we have to make use of our intellect. In an instinctive way we understand (intuitively) the soul of another, and the effort the psychologist has to depose is to understand it explicitly.

The above analysis refers to the soul in rapport mainly with the determinant of perceiving. In an analog way, we can express the mystical participation for feelings and wishes, based on the fact we feel and wish not in isolation, but together, being social beings, characterized by sympathy and empathy (through intropathy\(^12\)). Our study represents a trial to make the mystique accessible for rationality, a trial to ground its city rights.

**Note on originality:**

One would say that the copyright for the inclusionality idea belongs to Alan Rayner and Ted Lumley (Mr. Rayner does challenge such an out fashioned notion as copyright). However, they are thinkers, not philosophers, just as Cioran, in all honor, he rejected the title “philosopher”. My version of inclusionality differs in several respects from theirs and I’m still the Sapere aude freak, hoping there is some dialogue possible between Christians and Pagans.

I think there is a difference between my participationism and inclusionality: while inclusionality rejects Euclidian-based interpretation of space (together with all non-Euclidean geometries which were derived from it, Euclidean means here clear and distinct partitioning of space, both literally and figuratively), I made a synthesis between inclusionality and Euclidean idea.

A Pagan version of this theory is accessible at Yvonne Aburrow’s Yew Tree site at [http://www31.brinkster.com/yewtree/resources/inclusionality.htm](http://www31.brinkster.com/yewtree/resources/inclusionality.htm). My version is philosophic and Christian, and it has been developed in ignorance of their work. I think that the idea originates in Heidegger and the Jungian rendering of cardinal Berkeley, and it is traceable back to Paul’s “Christ liveth in me” (*Galatians 2:20*), taken together with *Acts 17:28* and *John 1:1*. However the authors above have the merit of expressing it first, in an explicit form.

Finally, I cannot avoid giving credits to G.H. Mead, who wrote in “The Emergent Self” in *Mind, Self and Society*, apud J. Farginis’ *Readings in Social Theory*, 4th edition, p. 157: “No hard-and-fast line can be drawn between our selves

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\(^{12}\) Osho noticed very well that, when a sad person joins joyous people, he/she rejoices, and when a joyous person enters a sad people’s company, he/she becomes sad.

When a family’s member enters the house at anger, the rest of the family feels its trouble, even if he/she does not manifest himself/herself.

Wishes, they too are shared, because of soul communion. Perversion under such an aspect is the manipulation, which means imposing an alien will, always using the manipulated person for purposes adverse to his/her nature and essence.
and the selves of others, since our selves exist and enter as such into our experience only in so far as the selves of others exist and enter as such into our experience also.”

I hope it is clear that while I see somebody’s ego as defined by a hard-and-fast line (yet a dynamical one) drawn around it, I allow for the interpenetration of selves. Please perform the following experiment, either virtually or objectually: send the file 2questions.pdf to ten persons you know; then, all eleven of you shall have the same piece of information. What is the consequence thereof? From the viewpoint of Platonic realism, information can be seen and treated as a substance, indeed a shareable substance. Sensations, feelings, desires, emotions, and thoughts, they can be treated as interpenetrating pieces of sharable substance.

Besides, a work of Rupert Sheldrake, of 1995, states "Permit yourself to think that your perceptions of all the things you see around you are indeed around you. Your image of this page, for example, is just where it seems to be, in front of you. [...] This idea is so staggeringly simple that it is hard to grasp. Although in perfect accord with immediate experience, it undermines everything we have been brought up to believe about the nature of the mind, the interiority of subjective experience, and the separation of subject and object." [http://www.sheldrake.org/experiments/staring/](http://www.sheldrake.org/experiments/staring/)

See also:

[http://members.home.nl/tgeorgescu/Justification_of_my_knowledge_theory_ideas.html](http://members.home.nl/tgeorgescu/Justification_of_my_knowledge_theory_ideas.html)

and:

[http://members.home.nl/tgeorgescu/A_rebuttal_of_solipsism.html](http://members.home.nl/tgeorgescu/A_rebuttal_of_solipsism.html)