chapter 2

Pursuit
How units ended up in Zuid-Limburg

       On September 18, 1944 , the area north and south of Aachen fell under the responsibility of the LXXXI. Armeekorps, which was a part of the 7. Armee. The soldiers that were driven past the railroad tracks at Nuth that morning, and past Hoensbroek towards Brunssum, belonged to the 275. Infanteriedivision commanded by general Hans Schmidt. This man was born in 1895, and had come from Russia to France in December 1943. In Brittany he got the command over the 275. Infanteriedivision.[1] During the battle, rear fights, and stormy flight from Normandy up to the borders of the Greater German Empire, this division had four times been chopped down to pieces that bad, that it could not be recognized anymore as a fighting unit.[2]
       The invasion of the European continent, and also the beginning of the defeat of the fascists in France, had started on June 6, 1944 , in the sector of the 7. Armee, at those days still under the command of general Friedrich Dollman. In the little more than three months to follow, this army would wear out four different commanders, and for a short period it was not clear, weather this army still existed at all.

       Forced back

       In the area of St. Nazaire, on the south coast of Brittany, the 275. Infanteriedivision had the task of stopping invaders coming over sea. It was a static division, which meant, that they were not capable of taking care of their own transportation. The invasion was expected to take place where the Channel was on it’s smallest: a few hundred miles to the north. Life in St. Nazaire was relatively good, for an occupier. Not the preverbal God in France, but ‘boche en France’.
       In Berlin in early 1944 the conviction grew, that the best way to the European continent wasn’t necessary the most obvious. The best alternative was the coast in Normandy between Cherbourg and the mouth of the Seine. As a part of the preparations for this possibility, part of the 275. Infanteriedivision was made mobile: soldiers without rank were given bikes, and transportation of guns was taken care of by horses. Supply was taken care of by motorized transportation and horses.[3]
       Eventually the long awaited invasion actually took place in Normandy, and general Schmidt could immediately sent a mobile Kampfgruppe, after an order for reinforcement came in. As usual this Kampfgruppe bore the name of its commander, Oberst –major- Heinz. The division got this order in the morning of June 6. Kampfgruppe Heinz departed by train, but the Allied air force and the resistance in Brittany caused delays. Not until after a week did the first elements of the Kampfgruppe reach the invasion area, 120 miles to the north. The battalions who had bikes to their disposal were there first.[4]

        The OKW (Ober-Kommando der Wehrmacht; the supreme command of the ground forces) expected the actual invasion still to take place around Calais. Therefore it was out of the question to weaken the army there, the 15. Armee. That is why the fascists for instance called in the help of the II SS-Panzerkorps, under command of SS-general Paul Hausser, all the way from Poland on the eastern front. The order came in on June 12, but not until the end of that month were they deployed in the invasion area.[5]
       On July 7 the main force of the 275. Infanteriedivision was ordered north for reinforcement. It arrived more than ten days later.[6] By that time the 7. Armee had a new commander, because Dollman had died of a heart attack on June 28. Hausser, who was scarred by the wounds he sustained on the eastern front, replaced him. This SS-man decided to keep the main force of the 275. Infanteriedivision not far behind his lines.[7]

       Operation Cobra: the Allied breakout

       Kampfgruppe Heinz, amongst others, had dug in north of the 275. Infanteriedivision. A little further to the north were the lines of the Americans. Between the belligerent parties, running from east to west along the frontlines, lied the road from St.-Lô to Lessay. The Americans were preparing a major attack to get out of the hedgerows of Normandy, the Bocage: operation Cobra. They intended to start this attack with a big bombardment: a so-called barrage.
       Due to several causes, the more than four million kilo of bombs and napalm[8] also caused losses in the lines of the awaiting Americans. The most number of victims fell in the 30^th US Infantry Division: approximately 100 dead and 500 wounded.[9] In the ranks of this division the term ‘air support’ was never to be used again, without the reminder of the consequences of this barrage.
       Also amongst the spectators were fatalities: reporters for magazines and military observers. Amongst them general Lesley J. McNair, the brains behind the earlier described reorganizations and cutbacks.[10] He was buried in silence, because he was the commander of the dummy army group, invented to make the fascists believe in an invasion near Calais. The news that he was killed in a foxhole in Normandy was not to get out, before a replacement had taken his position in the United Kingdom.[11]

        After the barrage, and the ensuing attack on July 25, the remains of the Kampfgruppe Heinz had been annihilated in the fighting near the hamlet Hébécrevon.[12] During the further battle, of the 275. Infanteriedivision remained only small groups of fighters, and the headquarters staff.[13]
       The American infantry forged an opening, and when the day after tanks were put in, the definitive breakthrough was a fact: away of the bridgehead, and gone from the Bocage  

[1] Hans Schmidt: 275th Infantry Division (15 September-1 October) (MS#B-373), ii.
     MS stands for Military Study. These were made to be of help in writing a historical study. Commanders of bigger fascist units wrote these surveys on what the units encountered in the field. These were mainly based on their recollection, personal notes, other MS-ses, and remaining maps and messages.
     As will be evident from the rest of this chapter, the month of September 1944 showed a very misty view of the tactical situation. Mostly the papers of the fascists were destroyed, or not kept at all, if the HQ’s were close to the frontline. About the divisions hardly any source material is left; the smaller units even less. The Allied units left much material for the historians.

[2] Hans Schmidt: New Formation of the Division at Cambrai and Commitment at Peronne and St. Quentin 20 aug. 1944 until 4 Sep. 1944 (MS#B-371), 17; Schmidt (MS#B-373), 7; Martin Blumenson: Breakout and Pursuit, Washington , 1961, 273. The first time happened during operation Cobra; the second at the double envelopment near Falaise – Argentan; the third when they were surrounded at Mons ; the fourth as a result of the fights during their retreat through South-Limburg.

[3] Gordon A. Harrison: Cross-Channel Attack, Washington , 1951, 254.

[4] Harrison , 378, 379.

[5] C. Bauer en Th. A. Boeree: De slag bij Arnhem , Amsterdam/Brussel, 1963, 66, 67.

[6] David Garth: St-Lô , Washington , 1994 (facsimile reprint of the book of 1946), 50, 93.

[7] Garth, 123; Blumenson, 169.

[8] Oil mixed with gasoline. The name stems from the first letters of the ingredients NAfta and PALMoil. What comes close to it is a Molotov Coctail with a mixture of 3 to 1; gas for a moped usually is 50 to 1. Napalm was first used on July 17, 1944 , not far from Coutances (Lewis H. Brereton: The Brereton Diaries, New York, 1946, 309-310).

[9] Blumenson, 229, 237.

[10] Blumenson, 236.

[11] Omar N. Bradley: A Soldiers Story, New York , 1999 (facsimile reprint of the book of 1951), 349.

[12] Blumenson, 240.

[13] Blumenson, 273-275.

       The retreat became a flight

       Since the beginning of the invasion the fascists had been driven back, and reinforcements (only six percent of the wounded and killed were replaced[14]) immediately after arrival were thrown in the fights. There was no defense in depth, and no new lines in the rear. All available troops were in use and had been used up, to contain the Allies in their bridgehead. But now that a breakout had been achieved, the fascists were left behind in panic. The commander of the fascists in the west, Von Kluge, described the tactical situation during a telephone-conversation with one word: “Riesensauerei”; a big swine stable.[15]

        A fascist being gullible, or convinced of the just cause of the Nazis, could find the motivation not to surrender in the propaganda. One of the reasons to keep on fighting was the story about an Allied schism at some time in the future. If the war could only last long enough, to let that happen. An other reason that the war would end in favor of the fascists was the introduction of the flying bombs.
       A new phase in the war started on June 13, with four loud explosions. From at London aimed launching-constructions ten projectiles had departed that day. These ten looked like small planes, and were named Fieseler Fi-103, or V-1 (the V of Vergeltungswaffe, meaning weapon of retaliation). The Americans and Brits called the contraption ‘buzz-bomb’, because of it’s characteristic sound. Whenever the fuel ran out, the engine coughed one or two times, it fell in a short glide, and a ton of explosions would fly sky-high.
       The V-1 was not very accurate, but a big explosion was guaranteed. The greatest number of victims caused by one single V-weapon fell on December 16, 1944, in Antwerp, when a cinema was hit at 15.20 o’clock during a showing of Buffalo Bill (the version titled The Plainsman featuring Cary Cooper and Jean Arthur)[16]: 567 dead and 291 heavily wounded was the macabre harvest of this V-bomb. More then half were from the military.[17] The Vergeltungswaffen increased the sufferings of war, but these weapons never had an influence on the outcome of the war.
       My mother, evacuated from the village Neer in the middle parts of Limburg to Noord-Brabant by British soldiers, stayed in the fly-route to Antwerp. With the ’host’-family they prayed every time they heard a buzz-bomb coming over: ‘Onze Lieve Vrouwke, geef em nog een douwke’ –‘Holy Mary dear, shove it away from here’-.
       More dangerous, because it could only be heard when it was too late, was the V-2: this rocket flew faster than sound. On September 8, 1944, this rocket, A-4 was the production name, became active: first it was fired at Paris, and that same day twice against London. These were launched from Wassenaar, situated near The Hague.[18]

        Because of the deteriorating situation in Normandy 15. Armee was ordered to send reinforcements -on a small scale-. Amongst others the LXXXI. Armeekorps. This had to take command over the divisions rushed from the south of France during the first half of August, to stop the speedy motorized American units.[19] But this already was too late, and an envelopment of the deployed fascist units in Northern-France became more and more obvious.

        In the beginning of July 1944 the army-command in Berlin had come to the conclusion, that the battle against the invaders in Normandy was not gaining any ground, and was only costing men and materiel. Reading between the lines, this conclusion could be interpreted as an introduction of the retreat from France. The chronicler of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht noted in the beginning of July, that this country could be considered lost.[20] Further running behind the developments on the battlefields, the OKW gave permission in mid-August to fall back on defensive lines in the hinterland, starting with the non-combatant units.
       The encirclement of the troops in North-France approached its completion. At the same time (mid-August, 1944) the Allies had invaded the Rivièra, and chased the fascists from South-France. The decision to withdraw meant the beginning of the evacuation from France.[21]
       They tried to escape from the trap, but for many it was too late.[22] Approximately 40,000 men (most belonged to the non-combatant units)[23] found a way out of the pocket of Falaise – Argentan. In the shot up area, between abandoned and destroyed army materiel, approximately 10,000 dead were found. About 50,000 prisoners of war were made.[24] One of them was an SS-man from Austria, who belonged to a group of weary soldiers, not wanting to fight until the end. He surrendered to British soldiers. Around 1978 I spent several summer-holidays together with my parents and brothers in his boarding house annex farm. In 1999 all of a sudden he decided to speak to my father about his war-experiences.
       A different SS-man determinately went on fleeing out of the pocket, and got wounded. Due to his new wounds general Hausser lost the capacity to command the 7. Armee. This command temporarily was given to general Finck, and at the end of August handed over to general Heinrich Eberbach, the former commander of the 5. Panzerarmee.[25] Having gone further to the north, he sought time, to reactivate the 7. Armee. But he apparently had misjudged the speed of the Allied advance. He and what were left of the staff of the 7. Armee were captured by British soldiers around Amiens. It was humiliating for this high officer, but it clearly gave an indication of the element of surprise: he still wore his pyjamas when he was taken prisoner.[26] From the beginning of September general Erich Brandenberger was commander of the 7. Armee; the fifth in three months time.
       When at the villages of Falaise and Argentan the double envelopment definitively was closed, the Führer had 60,000 warriors less to push around on his situation-maps.

        In the last week of August the 49. Infanteriedivision, coming from the 15. Armee, was deployed at the Seine , to help the remnants of the army during their retreat.[27] By the time this division had been driven back to Zuid-Limburg, it was no more than a shadow of what it once had been.

       Clearance

       On the Allied side of the frontlines problems became bigger because of the breakout. Problems in the advancement of men and materiel in the required quantities already arose in the shipping to, the ship discharge at, and transportation from the harbors further land inwards (the clearing of the docks).
       Supplying and strengthening the invasion forces on the European continent happened for the most part by ship and through the beaches of Normandy. Unloading ships happened with an average of no more than 35,000 tons a day.[28] A selection was made in what ship had to be discharged, and what ship not. Sometimes (parts of) a cargo was sent back, because it was not necessary enough.[29] In begin-September 1944 more than 100 Liberty cargo vessels were awaiting discharge in a repaired harbor at the coast of the Channel.[30] On September 15, in Marseille on the French Rivièra, the first Liberty ship came in for direct ship-to-shore discharge. Thanks to the vastness of the harbor complexes an overcapacity was reached here. Part of the ships off the coast of Normandy were diverted to Marseille.[31]

[14] Blumenson, 181.

[15] Blumenson, 323.

[16] Stadsarchief Antwerp, in a letter of February 16, 1998; William I. Hitchcock: De bittere weg naar de vrijheid, Amsterdam 2009, 82 (The Bitter Road to Freedom, A New History of the Liberation of Europe, New York, 2008).
[17] Johan de Roey (historical views) and Maryse van Hee (interviews): Hun kleine bevrijding, Antwerp , 1994, 54.

[18] Percy Ernst Schramm: Die Invasion 1944, Munich, 1963, 256; After the Battle / 40-45 Toen en Nu, London / Soest, no year, number 6, 30.

[19] Blumenson, 422.  

[20] Schramm, 93.  

[21] Schramm, 117; Blumenson, 523, 535.  
[22] Schramm, 112.  
[23] Blumenson, 555.  
[24] Blumenson, 557-558.

[25] Blumenson, 557. In his diary general Brereton, commander of the First Allied Airborne Army, noted on August 19, that him had been told, that the 7. Armee ‘had been smashed in a day of concentrated air attacks’ (Brereton, 334).  

[26] Brian Horrocks, Eversley Belfield and Hubert Essame: Corps Commander, New York , 1977, 72; Milton Shulman: Defeat in the West, Londen, 1963² (first publication in 1947), 173; Schramm, 137.

[27] Blumenson, 576.  

[28] Roland G. Ruppenthal: Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II: September 1944 – May 1945, Washington , 1959, 12.  
[29] Roland G. Ruppenthal: Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I: May 1941 – September 1944, Washington, 1953, 568; Lida Mayo: The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront, Washington , 1968, 302.  
[30] Ruppenthal deel II, 12; Logistics in World War II, Washington, 1993 (facsimile reprint of the book of 1947), 144, 169; Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson: The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, Washington, 1957, 310-312.  
[31] Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith: Riviera to the Rhine, Washington, 1993, 204; Ruppenthal volume II, 17.  

       In the first six weeks of the battle on the continent, the bridgehead was relatively small. That is why most supplies could easily be delivered to the fighting units directly from the main dumps on the beaches. The landscape hindered the attack, but also any counterattack. The Bocage (Normandy hedgerow country) was made up out of small patches of farmland with a hedgerow around it. This kind of hedgerow was formed by an earthen wall of a yard high, overgrown with (thorn-) bushes and trees. A barricade every hundred yards, that was what the Bocage stood for.
       Everything connected with logistics (transportation, storage, distribution, maintenance to cars and roads, planning dumps, etcetera) did not cause any problems, thanks to the slow advance of the armies. If traffic jams are left out of considering.[32] But after the breakthrough on July 25 the liberated area became larger in a higher tempo. The repair of bombed and sabotaged railroads came further behind schedule, so that most transportation had to be done by truck. Averagely 7000 tons were transported each day, in August and begin September, with these trucks (mostly deuce-and-a-half GMC’s).[33] On August 29 a record was achieved: that day 12,342 tons were delivered to the frontlines.[34]

        But more than 25,000 tons a day remained on the beaches. By the end of August this had accumulated to 90 / 95% of all the supplies in the ETO (=European Theater of Operations).[35] The need for supplies was bigger than what could be loaded into ships at the British south-coast. Sometimes people did not take the time, to keep record of what was loaded.[36] Discharge on the far shore also happened in a hurry. Often this happened in bad weather, and the sand was not good for the readability of the several codes on the crates. This all led to uncertainty about what was where, and in what quantities dumped on the beaches.[37] The results of a thorough analyze after munitions, when the war was over, led to the conclusion, that in the ETO always were enough of these, with the exception of a couple of heavier calibers. It was not always obvious, where the wanted product was stored.[38]

       Expected development

       The advance of the conquest of the European continent had been laid down beforehand in schedules. These helped determine the amount of supplies for the armies, and what was when to be shipped, in order to build up structures in the liberated area.
       Everything ran behind schedule up to the breakout of the Bocage. The battle was tough, and the advance was slow. At the start of operation Cobra, when the Allies were unleashed, it was D+49 (day 49 after D-Day = July 25). The planners had assumed the fronts to reach this line on D+20. The moment the Seine was reached was estimated to be on D+90. But the armies had reached this river on D+79. All in all, the advance from the Bocage up to the Seine took 30 days instead of the estimated 70.[39]
       In order to support these armies, a whole system of dumps, hospitals, forward airfields, projects of reconstruction, and places for maintenance had to be erected. The plans were based on these. The time that was reserved for tactical developments on the battlefield, also was needed badly for the securing of the conquered area, and setting up an infrastructure. From the moment of the breakout until the Seine was reached, 70 days had been foreseen for this. And the whole system was based on the support of no more than twelve divisions at the Seine. But on D+90 (September 4) already sixteen divisions were up to 150 miles beyond that big stream.[40] The support of the armies became deeper and deeper enwrapped in problems.

        Prior to the invasion there had been decided, to pause at the Seine before continuing deeper inland, so that service troops could build up the interior of the liberated area. But after weeks of heavy fighting for every yard of Bocage, the enemy had been driven back convincingly, and gain now could be measured in miles a day. The supreme commander in the ETO, general ‘Ike’ Dwight D. Eisenhower, was afraid to lose the momentum of speed, and decided on August 19 to let go of the original planning, and to continue the chase.[41] He hoped to achieve a bridgehead across the Rhine, before the supply reached its limits, and the armies were forced to stop.[42]

        Trucks were used in the last phase of the transportation to the fighting units. Cargo had to be transported by these from the invasion beaches over the roads of Normandy. The roads were too small for traffic in both directions.[43] Fuel for the vehicles was the most needed item in the pursuit of the fleeing fascists across the Seine, and always the deliveries fell short of the wants. From this need was born the Red Ball Express:[44] an almost unending column of trucks, circling between the depots on the beaches of Normandy and the rear of the fighting units. As much as possible was brought up, to postpone the moment, that mere need caused the troops to stop. Even bombers were modified for cargo transport. And still the bottom of the barrel wasn’t scraped.

       Airborne operations

       During times that wanted supplies could not all be delivered because of shortages, things had to be rationalized according to priorities. The use of the harbor of Antwerp could mean a solution for the supply problems. At the same time an advance to this city would mean the liberation of the area from where the fascists were launching their mass-destruction weapons V-1 and V-2 towards England. That is why general Eisenhower decided, that the thrust north would get priority on the delivery of gasoline, munitions, and-so-forth.[45]
       On this left wing of the Allied advance, heading north, were located the units of the 21^st British Army Group. Their commander, fieldmarshal Bernard L. Montgomery, had to his disposal the early in August 1944 activated First Allied Airborne Army.
       On the right was the American 12th Army Group, under command of general Omar N. Bradley. Three armies formed this army group. The First US Army, commander general Courtney H. Hodges, which, while advancing north, had the task of protecting the British right flank. Also a part of this army group was the Third US Army, general George S. Patton jr., advancing further to the south, and lowest in supply-priority. Bradley gave this army the order to make contact with the 6th Army Group (given this name at September 15, 1944) after its landing in South-France. It was expected, that the Allied armies up to the borders of Luxembourg would receive material support from the harbor town of Marseilles.[46]

[32] John D. Millett: The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, Washington , 1954, 84.

[33] John C. Warren : Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater, Maxwell, 1956, 85.

[34] Ruppenthal volume I, 560.

[35] Charles B. MacDonald: The Siegfried Line Campaign, Washington , 1963, 12.

[36] Bykofsky and Larson, 261.

[37] Mayo, 251; Bykofsky and Larson, 265-266.

[38] Logistics in World War II, 97.

[39] Ruppenthal volume II, 5.

[40] Ruppenthal volume II, 6.

[41] Ruppenthal volume I, 479.

[42] Dwight D. Eisenhower: Kruistocht door Europa, ’s-Gravenhage, 1952⁵, 230.  

[43] Bykofsky and Larson, 331.

[44] This term stems from the railroad world: a fast freight train, which has priority over slower vehicles. (Pocket Dictionary of American Slang, New York, 1976⁹ .)

[45] Forrest C. Pogue: The Supreme Command, Washington , 1954, 260.  

[46] Eisenhower, 231-232.

The Airborne operations

       Up to now the following list has never been published in full. Probably that is why numbers of given operations differ.
       This list contains all the airborne-operations in the European Theater of Operations that were given a name. Whenever possible it gives a chronological survey.
              Sources: Brereton: The Brereton Diaries, New York, 1946;
                             Craven & Cate:  The Army Air Forces in World War II, volume 3, Chicago, 1951;
                             Warren: Airborne Operations in World War II European Theater, Maxwell, 1956.

       Somewhere after D-Day piece by piece the deployed Allied airborne units were pulled back out of the action: of the 101^st US Airborne Division and 82^d US Airborne Division no sighting was made by the enemy after respectively June 27 and July 8. The British 6^th Airborne Division had to keep on fighting until August 26, and could not be redeployed again until somewhere in the winter. These units received extra training, and special equipment. This made them too big an investment, not to be put into action again. Friend as well as foe knew this. Any moment in August 1944, or perhaps in September, could this special fighting force be dropped somewhere behind the lines of the soldiers of the Greater German Empire.[47] Only the when and where remained a question for everybody.

       Operation Linnet

       In his book (published 1951) the commander of the 12^th US Army Group, general Omar N. Bradley, wrote, that the ‘First Allied Airborne Army showed an astonishing faculty for devising missions that were never needed.’[48] Against the few airborne-actions that took place stood a multitude of canceled ones. Preparations for actions only caused delay in the delivery of scarce goods. At every airborne-action parachutists were brought to the drop zone by C-47 ‘Dakota’ transportation planes (the so called carriers). Whenever such a deployment was canceled, these planes had to be rearranged for economic delivery of supplies. Because of this these planes could not be used for delivery to the furthest advanced units for several days. This was the case at, for instance, operation Linnet: the landings around Tournai in Belgium.

        In order to ease a push north, an airborne assault was planned on September 3 around Tournai. At the end of August this town lay more than 70 miles behind the front, in totally occupied Belgium. Bradley stated, that his troops could reach Tournai by land sooner, and that the carriers were better used if carrying supplies. He issued orders for the commander of the First US Army, to take the town before the parachutists could. Eventually that order reached the XIX US Corps ‘Tomahawk’, on August 31, where it was translated into practical possibilities. In the following night the orders reached the 2^d Armored Division ‘Hell on Wheels’ amongst others.[49] The chase of the running fascists gained speed and headed in northern direction. These armored spearheads managed to reach Tournai a few hours before the deadline would elapse. Before midnight the 30th Infantry Division ‘Old Hickory’ secured the town itself.[50] During this thirty-six hours lasting dash the reconnaissance unit of the ‘Hell on Wheels’, de 82^d Reconnaissance Battalion, was the first Allied unit to cross Belgian border: at 09.30B on September 2.[51]
       At a quarter past five Bradley was awoken with the message, that a complaint had come in from Montgomery: Bradley’s troops blocked the roads in Tournai for the British ground troops, who had arrived there too.[52]

        Bradley had been proven right. But during those same days the preparations for Linnet also went through, and it had not been possible to use the carriers for the supply of scarce goods to the fast advancing spearheads of the armies. The supply through the air of the American army with the highest priorities, the First Army, was halted six days because of this, and awaiting the permission for operation Linnet II, planned on September 4.[53]

       Defensive lines

       The lines in North-France which the fascists were supposed to fall back on, were not ready.[54] The defenders were driven back further towards Germany. And the first thing they would meet there, was the for four year long neglected propaganda object: the Westwall. Everywhere along the German west-border ran this defensive line, sometimes several miles thick. It was made of concrete rows of vehicle blocking devices (the so called Höckerlinie or dragon teeth), and all kinds of pillboxes for men and guns. And whenever possible the terrain was used for the defense. The landmines and the barbed wire were removed a few years earlier for service on the Atlantikwall (the famous defense line along the Atlantic coast). Trenches and tank-ditches were not deep enough anymore. Due to neglect, fields of fire had become overgrown, which favored the natural camouflage. This defense line had never reached completion, and now it had to be restored all of a sudden.[55]

[47] Schramm, 145.  

[48] Bradley, 402.  

[49] Blumenson, 679-680.

[50] This does not apply to an old American hickory tree, but to Andrew Jackson (his nickname), the 7^th president of the United States from 1829-1837. He accumulated fame by the way he obtained Indian territory for the young republic. His policy for making these territories free of Indians is one of the blackest chapters in American history. (Alwin M. Josephy jr.: The Indian Heritage of America, Harmondhsworth, 1975, 324-325)

[51] After Action Report  2^d Armored Division, September 2, 1944 .

[52] Bradley, 404.  

[53] Bradley, 403; Warren, 87.  

[54] Schramm, 119.  

[55] Horst Rohde: Vom Westwall zur Siegfried-Linie, in: Der Westwall, vom Denkmalwert des Unerfreulichen, Cologne , 1998², 53.

       Time was needed, if this line was to be made useful again. OB West –supreme command of the armies in the west- estimated that six weeks were necessary for restoring the wall.[56] So the enemy of the fascists had to be stalled as much as possible. Soldiers were to perform that task. Prisoners of war, slave workers and civilian volunteers had to take care of the rest.

       The actual wonder-weapon: the people

       Since the start, on June 6, 1944, of the invasion of Western Europe the Greater German Empire had suffered one bloody setback after the other. The advance from Normandy, and the approach of the Red Armies of the Soviet-Union were an immediate threat for the fatherland: the Heimat. Therefore was decided on July 25, 1944 , that the whole country had to focus completely on the war. All museums were closed; holidays were all canceled and the working week was made longer; mail, film, theater, traffic, press, etcetera, all was limited; nearly all professional educations were closed; more people were forced to work in the war-industry.[57] Youth were clearing the debris in the bombed cities and factories; their little sisters and brothers were brought to safety in the rural areas, and were put to work on the farms; elder brothers of not even twenty were drafted for service, and if someone volunteered and was only sixteen, he also got a gun and a uniform.[58] This kind of volunteers existed! Eleven year of dictatorship and propaganda paid off, and they were crushed between the wheels of the war-machine in the land of total war.

[56] Schramm, p.145; Hugh M. Cole: The Lorraine Campaign, Washington, 1950, 194.

[57] Müller-Hillebrand, 172; Karl Heinz Jahnke: Hitlers letztes Aufgebot, Essen , 1993, 15.

[58] Jahnke, 12.

       KLV, Kinder Land Verschickung –send your children to the country-. The little children were sent away from the regularly bombed big cities to the rural areas. Farmers often saw extra helping hands in these refugees.

       On August 20 Hitler, to make the lines on the east and west border ready for defense, called upon all available men. Under guidance of the German fascist party, the NSDAP, prisoners of war, forced laborers, and youth from up to fourteen years had to dig trenches and tank-ditches.[59]

       Anything that could be used for waging war was brought forward. Hitler ordered on August 24 the creation of the Weststellung: a line that had to run from the estuary of the Schelde, along the Albert-canal, the Westwall from Aachen, the Maginot line, and valleys of streams in the northeast of France. The area between the Albert-canal at Maastricht to the Westwall at Aachen and along the streams Geul and Selzerbeek was mentioned explicitly.[60] In an order, dated September 1, this line was extra mentioned in a summary about the repair on the defense-qualities of the Westwall, and its extension to the IJsselmeer (the lake in the north).[61]

       The work on the Westwall in Nordrhein-Westfalen, the part of Germany bordering to Limburg , started on September 4. The organization had counted on one million workers, but eventually (around mid-September) this number totaled 235,000 over the whole Westwall. The party-members only care was for reporting as much miles of trenches as possible. They didn’t care weather or not it could military be put to use. When the engineers arrived, these were the experts through their work on the Atlantikwall, they were not trusted. Because people heard about the army being behind the attempted July 20 assassination on the Führer. So Nazi-civilians were not willing to hand over any authority.[62] What also was told was, that the generals were to blame for the bad situation. The army showed up faster than expected at the hopelessly incomplete Westwall, while propaganda had pictured a more positive image of the war.[63]

       XIX US Corps through Belgium

       After Tournai was liberated most vehicles of the XIX Corps could not go any further, because the fuel tanks were empty. The commander of the First Army decided to close the gap between the First and Third Army with the assistance of his VII and V Corps, because these were the closest to the river Maas. XIX Corps had dashed north to Tournai, and was not a candidate for the scarce fuel.[64]
        The 113^th US Cavalry Group (Mecz) ‘Red Horse’ advanced further through Belgium, often with German fuel in their engines:[65] the XIX Corps was searching from the sky over Belgium for enemy petrol supplies.[66] On September 9 these cavalry-men had a close look at Maastricht, and that evening the Maas was crossed at Liége, hardly five days later than the turned down plans of airborne-operation Linnet II took care of that. And with much less display of power.[67]
       Glorious victories could still be achieved during the first half of September. But the American fighters at the front lines had no reserves anymore. Everything that was brought forward still wasn’t enough to continue fighting at full capacity. The chase of the fascists had lost its speed, and they were past their state of confusion, which had dominated their morale during the last weeks of August, and the first couple of days of September.

       First things first, and “Gott mit uns”

       After the 49. Infanteriedivision had been almost completely destroyed in North-France, it distributed the order, to regroup again at Hasselt in Belgian Limburg. The remnants of this division came dripping in during the first days of September.[68]
       In the mean time not much more than the division-staff of the 275. Infanteriedivision had been able to escape from the encirclement at Mons, a city in the south of Belgium. Nails and barricades were expressions of the sometimes-open hostile attitude of the civilians. Brussels was reached at September 4. But British troops had already liberated the city itself. The remains of this division continued further east this time, towards the Dutch part of Limburg. That same day, and approximately at the same time, as a part of the liberation-parade through the Belgian capital, colonel Jean Piron (commander of the 1^st Belgian Brigade) laid flowers on the grave of the unknown soldier.[69] This unit would hold the lines on the British utmost east-wing along the channel from Wessem to Nederweert, where it runs into the Maas. They were to do this from the last days of September until the British attack across that channel[70] (during which attack the last part of Limburg west of the Maas was liberated).

       Going to Maastricht it struck commander Schmidt that civilians did not shoot at them or annoy them. ‘People were sitting in front of their houses in their best clothes, waiting for the show which was going to be performed before their eyes. We could see how whole laundry hampers were carried by, filled with flowers and gifts, and how the flags were laid ready, and in some places had already been run up. A happy stir could be felt everywhere.[71]
       High officers and whole headquarters had an easier retreat than the regular soldiers, because the first had transportation and good marching orders. This last group wound up at the Versprengtensammelstelle (place where soldiers who were lost, or had no contact with their unit anymore, were gathered, and reassigned).[72] When these soldiers were grouped around the still functioning headquarters, a chance for success as a unit of fighters existed.[73]
       Schmidt reported the arrival of his division to the again functioning headquarters of the 7. Armee, on September 5. He was sent to the also present LXXXI. Armeekorps,[74] in those days under the command of general Friedrich August Schack. Major Heinz and his staff too showed up, and on September 10 reported to general Schmidt.[75] The Kampfgruppe bearing his name had long time ago been wiped out at Hébécrevon.

        In and south of South-Limburg (the headquarters of) these units came together to fight the First Battle of Aachen.[76] Along with troops from the Greater German Empire, who often never had seen war from up close, they fought for the protection of the Heimat.

       Market-Garden

       SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) wanted to bring new speed to the chase of the fleeing fascists as long as the supply had not been exhausted. Besides, a bridgehead across the Rhine had not been realized. And the airborne troops had not seen action yet. Ten plans for their deployment in this phase of the battle lay ready. Montgomery surprised Eisenhower with Market-Garden. Ike saw in this plan the possibility to realize all his wishes for that moment.[77]
       The deep-sea harbor of Antwerp was needed for the support of an offensive into the Greater German Empire.[78] This was the biggest conquered harbor, and almost undamaged too. Eisenhower stated, that he attached much importance to the clearing of the entrance to this harbor. But he wanted to wait for the consolidation of a bridgehead across the Neder-Rijn at Arnhem.[79] In the long run it lasted until November 28 before the first freighter could come up to the quays to be unloaded.[80]
       The plan included a drop of three divisions and a battalion in the Netherlands (the parachute-part was as big as in Linnet), to consolidate the road across the rivers for the ground troops. This would speed up the race to the heart of Germany, and clear the way for the passing of the Westwall: going around it to the north. The codename for the advance over the ground was Garden; that of the airborne part was Market.

       Montgomery demanded a halt of all other armies, so that his plans for an eventual dash to Berlin would have enough support. Eisenhower was of the opinion that he reached too high. Besides, he did not want to give up the pressure that was put on the other parts of the lines. He did promise to support Garden by forwarding 1000 tons of goods and materiel to dumps around Brussels.
       Half of this transport was done by immobilizing three American divisions in Normandy, and using their trucks. The other 500 tons were flown in. Together with the grounding of carriers for preparation for Market, this meant a drop in the supply to the American Armies. During the four weeks preceding operation Market-Garden the Americans got about 25% less supply flown in: from 4185 to 3221 tons a week. The Brits saw an increase in that same period of 1000%: from 350 to 3712 tons a week.[81]
       D-Day for Market-Garden was set on September 17. (Instead of the liberation of Heerlen, the highlight of the day was the airborne operation in Noord-Brabant, Gelderland, and the most northern part of Limburg.) The fascists offered more resistance than expected, and made the ground troops arrive a week later than planned. They were only in time to evacuate the remaining paratroopers of the 1^st Br Airborne Division, the ‘Red Devils’, across the Neder-Rijn.
       Considering the fact, that on September 24 the operation had brought the Allies past Nijmegen, Market-Garden can be called a success. But especially amongst the soldiers of the Third Army shortages were felt, and resentment ruled: Eisenhower had given supply-priority to the 21^st Br Army Group, and in spite of that still no bridgehead across the Rhine had been realized.[82]

       To invade Germany over the north-flank and bring it on its knees still remained the basic idea for Montgomery. He saw a guaranteed success, but only if all other armies were to halt, and supply-priority given to him. Time after time he brought this idea forward.
       Amongst American commanders the habit ruled, to give every staff-member the opportunity to let his meaning be heard, before new military adventures were to unleash.[83] The next step was the execution of the given orders. Probably it was not made clear exactly to Montgomery, when the discussion phase had ended.[84]
       On December 1, 1944 , Eisenhower wrote a letter to Montgomery, diplomatically telling Montgomery to watch his words. He further wrote, that maybe a better result would have been achieved, had he not given Montgomery his way. With the three in Normandy for Market-Garden halted divisions Patton would have had a fair chance in reaching the Rhine between Mainz and Mannheim[85] (and maybe Hodges would have crossed this river, if Linnet II, Naples I and Naples II were executed with priority).

[59] Jahnke, 33.  

[60] Walter Hubatsch (publisher): Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939-1945, Koblenz, 1983², 273.  
[61] Hubatsch, 279.

[62] Manfred Gross: Der Westwall zwischen Niederrhein und Schnee-Eiffel, Cologne , 1982, 322-323.

[63] Friedrich August Schack: Die Kaempfe des LXXXI. Armeekorps von 4. bis 21. September 1944 (MS#B-816), in: Zeitschrift des Aachener Geschichtsvereins, nr.66/67 (year book 1954/1955), 213.

[64] MacDonald, 37.  
[65] The Americans had meant their vehicles to run on gasoline with a high octane; not on diesel. They did not have a problem with other types of fuel. They had chosen for predominantly one kind of fuel, to prevent having to initiate a separate line of supply for diesel, which would cause extra trouble. The army vehicles of the fascists could, if necessary, simply stop at any gas station, and have their tanks filled up, without any problems in the long run.  
[66] After Action Report (With Inclosures) G-4, XIX Corps, September 30, 1944 : the supplies were enlarged with 120.000 liters of captured gasoline, and formed a decisive aspect during this highly critical period. The canals were successfully screened for gasoline containing vessels; Frederic E. Pamp jr: Normandy to the Elbe, no place, 1945, 19; Ruppenthal, volume I, 506.  
[67] Brereton, 337.  
[68] Siegfried Macholz: The 49th Infantry Division (MS#B-792), 1.  

[69] Carnet de Campagne 1^ere Brigade Belge, September 4, 1944 , 1500 o’clock.  
[70] Carnet de Campagne 1^ere Brigade Belge, November 17, 1944 , the day patrolling on this part of the lines ends, and three days of rest in Leuven was to commence.  

[71] Schmidt (MS#B-371), 15.

[72] Helmuth von Osterroht: Tätigkeitsbericht über die Zeit meiner Verwendung als Kampfkommandant von Aachen in September 1944, in: Zeitschrift des Aachener Geschichtsvereins, Aken, nr.73 (year book 1961/1962), 46.  
[73] Hans Schmidt: Kaempfe im Rheinland der 275. Infanterie-Division (revision of the period from September 15 to 22, 1944 , of the MS#B-373), 8.  
[74] Hans Schmidt: Battles in Northern France (MS#B-372), 1.  
[75] Schmidt (MS#B-372), 2.  
[76] Nazi-propaganda regarded the city of Aachen to be an important part of the Greater German Empire, and the Nazi-ideology. The battles for the possession of this city in retrospect are seen in three phases: the approach, the encirclement and taking of the city itself, and the Third Battle of Aachen being the fights in the hinterland.  

[77] Eisenhower, 241; Brereton, 341.

[78] Ruppenthal volume II, 13.

[79] Pogue, 255; Ruppenthal volume II, 15.

[80] Norman C. Phillips and J. Nikerk: Nederland-Canada ( Holland and the Canadians), Amsterdam/Antwerp, 1946, 12.

[81] Ruppenthal volume I,  581.

[82] Ruppenthal volume II, 22.

[83] Pogue, 289; Horrocks, Belfield and Essame, 152.

[84] Pogue, 289.

[85] Pogue, 313-314.

       In the 28 days from August 20 until September 16, on 13 days no or almost no supplies could be forwarded by the C-47 carriers (Dakotas), due to airborne operations. On nine days the weather was too bad for flying, and on five of these the carriers were grounded anyway, because of alterations necessary for commitment in airborne operations.[86] Driven by these circumstances, the air supply in the American sector to the dashing spearheads was only on half capacity from mid-August to mid-September.[87]
       Supply through the air was very useful for the support of the furthest advanced units. These were responsible for maintaining the speed in the pursuit,[88] and often could not be followed by units to their rear. Through the sky was the alternative.[89] It was only too bad, that the use of airborne-operations in this period of rationing could only be proven at the expense of other army-branches.

       At the borders of the Greater German Empire

       The pursuit race from North-France slowly came to a halt. The stormy Allied advance could not be logistically supported enough. Not everybody saw this, because already during the last four weeks supply happened hand to mouth. At the mean time the dispersed fascists were regrouping in fighting units again. More and more significant resistance was offered: in northeastern France, where deep valleys favored defense; at the Westwall along Luxembourg and Belgium; along the rivers and channels in the north of Belgium.
       Slowly the war in the west evolved into a new phase, in which the defenders had the luck, that the attackers could not use their full slugging power. And the fights evolved on a terrain, which had been made favorable to the defender.

[86] Warren , 86.

[87] Ruppenthal volume I, 577-582; Warren, 86-88.

[88] Ruppenthal volume I, 576.
[89] Alfred Goldberg: Logistical Mobility, in: Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate (editor): The Army Air Forces in World War II volume 3: Europe : Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945, Chicago , 1958², 561.

       The hill under which lies bunker 161. This one was conquered first.

       Photograph taken on April 1, 2003.

       The soldiers that were chased out of North-France and Belgium were busy stopping the Allied war-machine. Therefore the occupiers of the Westwall for the most part had to come from the hinterland –the Heimat-. Defenders were gathered in a helter skelter way. Hitler-youth who brought weapons, found empty pillboxes, and stayed;[90] veterans who were last sent into battle in World War I; fanatics full of idealism, and without knowledge…

        ‘We’re gonna hang out the washing on the Siegfried Line, if the Siegfried Line is still there.’ These are the words to a popular English song from the days of the war. The Siegfriedstellung was one of the most important German lines in North-France during World War I. The final breakthrough of this line in October 1918 introduced the defeat of Germany.[91] With this breakthrough in mind the Allies dubbed the Westwall ‘Siegfried Line’.
       In 1944 the Westwall no longer had the reputation of being invincible. The Allies were doing all too well since the end of July; their minds were already set on the Rhine, and the Ruhr-area behind it. But the soldiers in the frontlines, overlooking the impressive rows of dragon teeth, and knowing everybody could be shot at from at least two different bunkers, most certainly were impressed. They knew that hanging their washing on the Siegfried Line would become quite an undertaking.

       At strongpoint Aachen

       The XIX Corps, The most left corps of the First Army, and all the way against the British zone, was forced to halt at Tournai, in order to save gas for the rest of their army.[92] The other two corpses of this army had reached the Belgian- and Luxembourg-German border at several places on September 12, 1944. Also not far south of Aachen in the Stadtwald - Municipal Forest-, where that day fighting for the possession of the bunkers had started.
       Report came in, that white flags were spotted in Aachen.[93] From the Pelzerturm, a high tower on the highest point of the wooded hills south of the city, Americans were in a good position to aim their artillery on the fascist guns in the lower parts where the buildings of the city were. While advancing to this observation tower between the treetops, the fascists had used this for artillery-observation. Now the Americans could do the same. Some fifty soldiers were guided through the dense under wood by someone familiar with the area, and prevented the demolition of the tower.[94] Because tanks too had found their way up, counterattacks upward in difficult terrain ended in disaster.[95]
       During this action the first conquered bunker had the number 161.[96] In the diary of the OKW was noted on September 12, 1944, that not far from Aachen the first stronghold in the Westwall had been lost: Stützpunkt 113.[97]

        More pillboxes in the forest left and right of this fortification were conquered, and eventually a ring was drawn from south to east around Aachen to Stolberg. In that last town elements of the 12. Infanteriedivision, arriving from September 16 onward, were thrown in the battle.[98] The frontlines kept on going to and fro in this second line of Westwall-pillboxes running through Stolberg. The battle became a fight from house to house, without clear developments.[99] In the edge of the woods south of Aachen arose a stalemate.

[90] Manfred Gross: Der Westwall zwischen Niederrhein und Schnee-Eiffel, Cologne , 1982, 333.

[91] Blumenson, 676 note 4.  

[92] MacDonald, 37.

[93] G-3 Journal 2^d Armored Division, September 13, 1944 , No.916, an at 1530B noted earlier message.

[94] Helmuth von Osterroht, 54-55.  
[95] Kriegstagebuch LXXXI Armeekorps, Funkspruch 2379, Absende Stelle 116. Panzerdivision, September 14, 1944 , 13.40.  
[96] Lucien Heichler: The Germans Opposite VII Corps in September 1944, (unpublished study) Washington , 1952, 13.  
[97] Schramm, 148.  
[98] Kriegstagebuch LXXXI Armeekorps, September 16, 1944 , 08.15, 09.15, 09.25 and 13.00.  
[99] Kriegstagebuch LXXXI Armeekorps, September 20, 1944 , 20.10.