GROWTH OF THE WESTWALL, and where bunker 161 fitted in

     If you want to read the elaborate and long version: stop surfing and run to your library for the following books:

---Dieter Bettinger & Martin Büren: DER WESTWALL, Die Geschichte der Deutschen Westbefestigungen im Dritten Reich, Osnabrück, 1990

---Manfred Gross: Der Westwall zwischen Niederrhein und Schnee-Eiffel, Cologne, 1982.

We're going to hang out the washing on the Siegfried Line.
Have you any dirty washing, mother dear?
We're gonna hang out the washing on the Siegfried Line.
'cause the washing day is here.

Whether the weather may be wet or fine
We'll just rub along without a care.
We're gonna hang out the washing on the Siegfried Line.
If that Siegfried Line's still there.

Mother dear I'm writing you from somewhere in France,
Hoping to find you well,
Sergeant says I'm doing fine, a soldier and a pal
Here's a song that we don't sing, this 'll make you laugh.

We're going to hang out the washing on the Siegfried Line.
Have you any dirty washing, mother dear?
We're gonna hang out the washing on the Siegfried Line.
'cause the washing day is here.

     There is always the possibility that when you make a hike along the western German border you’ll encounter tourists or treasure hunters with a metal detector. Let us not hope so, because they might find mines or other unexploded ordnance, unleashing destruction upon everything surrounding the finder.

     Sometimes farmers hide their concrete barn and sell ‘NO’ to anyone asking them about any objects of interest. That reaction is twofold: prevent frequent visits from wannabee archeologists, and give no excuse whatsoever to the authorities for starting a costly destruction, rendering the construction useless. And these officials might leave the remains where they are (if removal is not serving the interest of the community).

In the middle of the backyard of a ranch in Zweibrüggen near Geilenkirchen:
                                       the remains of bunker 200: an infantry section dugout.

     Not every bunker is registered on special maps. Furthermore several details can only be discovered when visiting the appropriate site. If you look at a topographic map with bunkers and their numbers on it you will most certainly call it a chaos. And you are right: there it no universal pattern, and more than one structure (sometimes only recognized by historians needing a handle for further historic research). And not everything that was planned actually saw completion. If the story of it’s growth is told, it must be a story of exeptions, improvisations,and simplifications. Most of the time brought about by shortages.


     At the moment of the start of the Blitzkrieg in the west in May 1940, the Westwall (the Allied called it Siegfried Line) was about 630 kilometers in length from Kleve to the Swiss border. A combination of more then 15.000 bunkers (pillboxes), 167 kilometers of dragon teeth, a multitude of anti-tank ditches, prepared roadblocks, trenches, minefields, and barbed wire could be found at strategic positions along the western German border. But the Westwall was far from complete. Not inpenetrable for motivated invadors, but it did serve it’s purpose: scaring off possible attackers, and rendering actual attacks into unmotivated attemps.
     Contrary to preplanned lines of fortifications the Westwall over the years grew in quantity as well as quality. Also a few other defensive fortifications existed, not belonging to the Westwall per se, but which ran alongside, or contributed otherwise to its defensive nature. Amongst these were the Luftverteidigungszone-West, Ettinger Riegel, and Neckar-Enz-Stellung. Some of these were ready for use before 1936.

     Since the end of World War I every country bordering Germany made defensive concrete structures. Trench warfare was furthered in concrete. And Germany was seen as the common threat because of the previous experiences. As a result of those fears Germany was crippled by the Peace Treaty of Versailles, and a reaction was bound to come.
     Germany too constructed defense lines in the interior, and also along the eastern borders (where the restrictions of ‘Versailles’ were less severe). In the years to come the Nazi-party came to power, and Hitler became dictator. The conscription was reintroduced, an air force (Luftwaffe) was formed, and in March 1936 the German army violated an other restriction of ‘Versailles’: they entered the Rhineland which had been forbidden area for that army.

     A month earlier, in February 1936, a secret reconnaissance concerning fortification-possibilities had been carried out. And a year earlier Hitler had decided on the bigger theory behind the fortifications: defense in depth (Befestigtes Gebiet).
     Construction plans for the Westwall bunkers were likely to be based on blueprints of earlier constructions in the east and at lines in the interior (whenever terrain made this possible). These were called Regelbauten. The use of these blueprints/Regelbauten facilitated and streamlined the building process, saving men, money, and materiel.
     Preference was given to smaller projects -simple and seperate bunkers- contrary to enormous complexes. Some of the latter were constructed, close to that part of France where the Rhine is not forming the border, but these were ready for defense only after several years of construction. But Hitlers aggressive political intentions asked for more instant solutions.


     GRENZWACHT PROGRAMM
     The first fortifications in the west were made whenever important roads or rivers crossed the border. Bunkers were light, with walls and roof made of 30 cm thick reinforced concrete, offering protection against machinegun-fire. This was called a D bunker. The next step was C: protection against sustained MG-fire from close range. The roof was 60 cm thick. In the long run bunkers were made with 350 cm thick concrete, providing protection against the explosion of a 4000 lbs bomb on the roof: A.
     The earliest gradations in strength (Ausbaustärken) became outdated due to an escalating arms race: no D bunkers were built after June 1938, and no more C bunkers after August of that same year. On the other hand cutbacks stimulated further construction of Regelbauten in strength B new and B old up to the end of WW II.

     PIONIER PROGRAMM
     The construction program at the borders in 1936 was followed by a program planned and supervised by army engineers. Already in February 1937 the completion-date of the Engineer Program had to be moved up to 1948. And that date had to be adjusted to 1952. Strength of bunkers was realized in C and B1 (100 cm roof). A structured defense of the fatherland would have been the result if time had been given for completion. The merely-stall-function of the defencive buildings (Sperrausbau) everywhere would have grown into a stop-function on a more and more permanent base (Stellungsausbau and Festungsausbau).
     But developements on the international scene demanded a more speedy growth of the fortifications.

Construction of a bunker in a forest as it might have happened in the Aachen Municipal Forest. This picture was published in the Völkischer Beobachter, November 1938.

     KRIEGSREGELBAUTEN
     In 1939 a new building program was introduced. Earlier experiences, further simplifications, and scarcity in building materiel led to new Regelbauten. This time numberd in the 500s. Lots of Regelbau numbers had been left out, because by the end of 1940 the total number of Regelbauten in use was little over 200. 

     44/45 PROGRAMM
     The next and last building activity took place four years later, when Allied soldiers were closing in on the German homeland. Lots of experiences had brought new knowledge, but shortness in materiel and crippled transportation possibilities determined the plans for a few new Regelbauten (numbered 600+). Also lots of Ringstände were built, mostly Koch-Bunker: a bit over 5 feet high and 4 feet wide concrete tube, lowered in the soil (an armored foxhole).
     But the forest south of Aachen had been liberated before improvements to the Westwall had been initiated.


     MANNING THE WESTWALL IN THE AACHEN MUNICIPAL FOREST
     Around the beginning of the month of September 1944 the Nazi-Army returned from France through Belgium in ever growing numbers. Wounded fighters, non-fighting army personnel, sympathizers, fraternizers, refugees. And once these people were in the fatherland all that stood between them and the enemy was the Westwall. Most of them kept running, but soldiers were stopped at collection points.
     The rearguard was covering the retreat, and in one of the hastily erected lines in Belgium or the Netherlands they had to take a last stand before permission was granted to fall back on the Westwall (orders were given to hold and not give in an inch). Occupants of the Westwall came from collection points, but mostly from ill trained replacement school battalions. Sometimes from unhealthy and/or old men or badly equipped recovering wounded. Or any other combination.

     The area from Aachen south to Monschau fell under the responsibility of Grenadier Ersatz und Ausbildungsregiment 253 (under Oberst=major Feind). It belonged to 526. Replacement Division. Directly west and south of Aachen (including the Municipal Forest) the responsible army outfit was the 453. Batallion. When this battalion could have had an extra load of soldiers from the collection point they refused: further north and south the Westwall lay in more open country, so these men could be put to better use there. Besides, these worn out soldiers were of little use in this thick forest (the same elsewhere as was proved later on).
     Two days later (September 9) new reinforcements were accepted: Fest.MG.Btl. 34 (500 men). These men arrived in Aachen at the western railroad station after three days of training. One company comprised of men 50 to 60 year old, and was deployed in a quiet stretch of the Westwall. The other two companies went to the 453. Btl.
     Also on 9 September the staff of 353. Infanteriedivision got ordered to go from Maastricht to Aachen, and prepare the Westwall in the sector of LXXXI. Armeekorps. The 10th this 353. I.D. took over command of a part of the Westwall, leaving only six kilometers west and south of Aachen to the commander of the city: Von Osterroth. But the 353. I.D. did not have enough time to accomplish their tasks.
On 11 September the Res.Pz.Pi.Btl. 16, which was responsible for blocking passages to the fatherland in the LXXXI Armeekorps sector, blew up several roads.
     American soldiers arrived at the Westwall north of Hauset and took bunker 161. 
     Sometimes army units were called to life and shuffled around as if unit strength was 100% of it’s nominal abilities. Sometimes soldiers themselves were not 100%. Sometimes resistance was not strong enough. Sometimes reinforcements arrived too late.


     NEVER RETAKEN
     As has been told in the chapter before: War Diary LXXXI. Armeekorps, 13 September at 04.45, Morning Report 353. I.D.: In the evening of 12 September 1944 a counterattack was undertaken. Some lost terrain was retaken, but attack bogged down. Was to be continued at daybreak.
     A radio call the next day at 13.40 gives final outcome: Every attempt for reconquest of line of bunkers had failed, not enough armored support and artillery observation due to thick forrest.
Why state this again? In 1948 the commander of LXXXI. Armeekorps, gen.-lt. F.A. Schack, while he still was a prisoner of war, wrote a study (like lots of other high placed captured officers) for historical purposes. But historical accuracy was not his strongest point: he writes of a complete success for a counterattack in the evening of 13 September concerning the intrusion at the bunker 161 area.

     IDENTIFICATION
     None of the numbers of any of the Regelbauten can be found on contemporary topographic maps. The numbers given on these are merely identification numbers for every individual bunker.
These can give information to a trained investigator into the history of the Westwall. Luckily for us chronology in the Aachener Municipal Forest is simple. Early in 1938 Hitler looked further north, and allowed bunkers to be built at borders with Luxemburg, Belgiam, and Netherlands. France posed no immediate threat to Aachen. Not until 1939 the second building activity in the forest took place, because the city of Aachen too had to be protected.
     The first wave of bunkers were given the numbers 35, 38, 39, 40, 46, and naturally some more, but not in the illustration. The numbers in between were given to machine gun positions. But by the time the Aachen-Saar Programm was layed out only the bunkers of the Grenzwacht were indicated on maps. The other numbers on this map from Gross book, page 64, were bunkers built from 1939 on. Their location on slopes of hills was tactical-perfect, but it was a thin line of bunkers. Observation was minimal, so more bunkers were needed to form a serious line. But in wooded areas due to shortages in materiel cutbacks were realized in the number of bunkers.

     BUT WHAT IS WHAT?
     Any conclusion about a used system of classification is open to debate. Simply because there are too many exceptions to any used system: for instance small alterations and mirrored versions, like bunker 161 in the Aachen Municipal Forest. Here we have an infantry section dugout from the Aachen-Saar Programm. So it is a Regelbau 101. Shortage in materiel determined construction, so version c, and d, were cheapest. And the d-version without observation-cupola, and only a kind of periscope mounted in the roof would have been favored. But shortage might have determined the absence of both, and a 50x50 cm hole in the roof (after one meter the shaft becomes 40x40 cm) is what might be discovered when this bunker is uncovered. By the way: in c, and d, the escape door is in the ready room/stand-to area.