A Refutation of Empiricism and Conventionalism Altogether

Demonstrated following a Heideggerian Inquiry into the Split between Knower and Known

The current scientific knowledge theory relies on two basic assumptions: empiricism and conventionalism. Here we will prove with factual and thinking evidence that both of them are empirically and logically invalid.

So, this theory says: my perception of green (a color) is basically mine and no other human being has the same perception of green as I have. Such a stance is utterly solipsistic and here it is why:

Be X and Y examples of normal persons, then if X’s perception of green and Y’s perception of green have no similarity, then the society cannot speak of something like green. Speaking of green things is to say that there is a similarity of the perceptions of green things, i.e. that X’s and Y’s perception of green somehow do agree.

Empiricism sees such a proof only too well, and in its vain attempt to the claim that empiricism is something else than solipsism, empiricism invokes conventionalism.

Conventionalism says that the word “green” reflects a social convention, i.e. that X and Y agreed to speak of “green” things, although there is no similarity between X’s perception of “green” things and Y’s perception of “green” things.

However, conventionalism posits a full lack of clarity about what is that a convention. We ask: do conventions exist inside the knower, outside of him or at the same time inside and outside him.

Thinking in the Kantian separatism between subject and others, subject and objects, it follows:

If conventions exist only inside the knower, then it is completely unexplainable why the people outside the knower, why they do obey the convention.

If conventions exist only outside the knower, then it is completely unexplainable why the knower knows of this convention and why does he act on a convention which cannot get inside him.

The only logical possibility there left is that the conventions exist at the same time inside and outside the knower, i.e. that they are like soap solution, which dissolves in both water (world outside of knower) and oil (knower). The later is an illustration, and it is not crucial here if we admit something as the concept of substance. Or, in a more appropriate metaphor, the oxygen is at the same time inside the cells and inside the blood; or the nervous impulse exists both inside the neuron and outside of it.

We read “Do not smoke!” by perceiving the writing with our eyes, or we hear it being read, or the policeman comes and we perceive the fine for smoking there and then we seek to get no subsequent fine. Here a perception, i.e. that of the writing, exists at the same time inside us (as knower, for we do get to behave accordingly) and outside us (in the world outside of the knower, i.e. in that it commands the behavior of people other than the knower).

So, if we are ever to obey such a sign, then something has somehow to break the logically vicious circle of perceptions relying on conventions and conventions relying on perceptions. But, if that is true, then conventions have the same cognitive status as perceptions.

If we say here that perceptions are totally different from conventions, then it is no longer clear how perceptions and conventions do exist at the same time inside a given knower and outside of him.

Fact is that people do perceive conventions and do convene on perceptions. The only way of getting this understandable is agreeing that the knower, the knowledge and the world being known are consubstantial (whatever something like substance means). I think it is clear that such a substance is not the matter of the materialism, and if the materialist insist of keeping his term, then he speaks of spirit (intelligence) under then name “matter”, and that, seeing the facts above, he can no longer use the term “matter” in the meaning of materialism.

Empiricism and conventionalism are a failure not because perceptions and conventions would not exist, but for in their implicit metaphysics (materialism), they deny the consubstantiality of knower, knowledge and known, i.e. in that they posit and insuperable gap between the material knower (as a real existence) and his knowledge (as a virtual existence). Basically, materialism sees material objects as the only existence, and virtual existence is a form of nothing. No wonder materialism annihilates thus the knower and his knowledge.

The glove is now not only in the face of materialism, but also (as idea duels command) in the face of existentialism, which has to produce a knowledge theory which takes the above into account.

So, if we reached here, it is because of Kant’s definition of subject, in which we above agreed to think. I think this is a reduction ad absurdum of Kant’s subject, i.e. of a subject bereft of his objects.

There’s an alternative to Kant’s definition, i.e. admitting that the objects and the others, we meet them INSIDE the subject!

This is my originality in knowledge theory and it was inspired by Heidegger’s denunciation of Kant’s proof on the exteriority of objects (critique upon “Just look at them, they are out of you!”)

So, factually, I did not disprove empiricism and conventionalism, but only Kantianism.

Empiricism could be very well redefined in a broader meaning, one allowing for conventions, i.e. inside my meaning of subject.

An even broader meaning of empiricism in humanities would be starting from Acts 5:34-39. A straightforward consequence thereof in political philosophy would be “Government does not have to be ‘good’, but only governable.”

Nazism and Marxian Communism were ultimately ungovernable systems, the first due to external causes and the second due to inner causes (I think Jesus’ Communism is in no way passé.)

Tudor Georgescu