BATTLE INSTRUCTION

for the commanding generals, brigade chefs, and commanders of the Prussian army after the Armistice of 1813,

by the Prussian king

translated by Geert van Uythoven

The Prussian brigade-disposition – in its origin a product of the deep insight of his majesty the King in the changed tactics of the latest conduct of war – had laid down the format of the tactics in a system. The cooperation of the various arms has been prepared according to this format, and the commanders have received a combat disposition which would provide a useful starting-point at all times, from which easily other formats could be adopted, according to what the terrain, the goal, and the enemy required. Something more detailed could not be given to a commander. Everything further was a result of the judgment, the military talent, and the experience of the commander. During the years of 1808-’12, the King had tried to replace the lack of experience as much as possible by staging very instructive manoeuvres in peace time, to make the use of the new tactics more fluent, Despite that however, as probably could not have been any other way, during the first act of the 1813 campaign the King in many instances had seen proof that his new directions had not bear fruit everywhere. Therefore he believed he had to draw the attention of his commanders once more, to what they should not lose sight of without having to make great sacrifices, when opposing such battle experienced enemies as the French were at that time. From this testifies the following instruction, which we will repeat here.

“While I noticed during the battles and combats that have taken place, that several kinds of arms were not always used efficiently, and that altogether not always enough disposition has been brought into combat, I want to bring into remembrance the following already long known rules of war before the upcoming continuation of the campaign, already often expressed by me.

These are general principles, which use can only favour the right moment; accepting these, and utilising them only then when it suits, can only be left to the right judgment of the commander.

1) It is generally not efficient, with the way our opponent wages war, to start the engagement with cavalry, or to bring all troops into battle immediately. Because of the way how he uses his infantry, he knows to maintain the fighting for a long time, and to feed it; he captures villages and forests, hide behind houses, fences and ditches; he knows to utilise these as protection against our attacks; to resist this way for a long time while using few troops, letting us suffer severely when we send huge masses against them. He will relieve his troops, bringing fresh ones into battle, while we have none left to oppose him again. Our forces have been spent, and we have to retreat.

Therefore, we will always have to follow the same principle the enemy has: to manage our forces, and to feed the combat until we will start our main attack.

2) Our artillery has acted without much effect, because it is too much divided, and the mass of it has been joined the fighting too early. We will prevent this mistake when we divide the artillery in three parts, of which the smallest part will start the fight, the second used for the main attack, and the third used as a reserve. The artillery would have to hold its fire more as has been the case up till now. Artillery batteries that fire too quickly can be the cause of losing battles. Therefore, the battery-commanders must be held responsible for: not firing their ammunition without use or effect, and acting with the utmost economy. Exceptions should only be the case at the decisive moment of battle, at the decisive points of the battle line, or there were one wants to deceive the enemy by executing a false but evidently very lively attack.

3) With the deployment of our artillery, a difference is been made if the deployment takes place for a false attack, or for the main attack. During the former case, the artillery pieces are not deployed close together, to deceive more about their strength, and to let them suffer less. During a main attack, these are more numerous, firing when possible concentric at one particular spot. If they can be deployed into a bend-in half circle, this goal will be achieved. If several batteries are together, and if the enemy remains behind a height, or somewhere else behind cover, then it will be efficient to unite the howitzers of these batteries, while more grenades directed at one certain spot will give a more fearful effect and be mostly irresistible.

4) During a cavalry attack, it remains the rule to surprise by doing the unexpected. It would always be necessary to hold back the attack, away from the fighting until the decisive moment, and not to be dispersed into single squadrons. When she is released, the accompanying artillery will first have to complete the disorder of the enemy troops, infantry as well as cavalry, by several volleys fired in quick succession. Then the attack has to follow suddenly; do not give the enemy the time to regain its senses or the result will be clear. In this way, the combat at Haynau was fought, and victory was ours.

5) The volunteers, which are mostly armed with rifled firearms, have increased our amount of riflemen; we have to use them more effectively. The advantage of the rifle compared with the musket is, that with a rifle one is able to fire with more accuracy at a greater distance then with a musket. The main consideration when using this weapon would also be to keep the enemy at a distance, so that our shots with all certainty harm the enemy, while the effect of his shots is doubtful. Suppose that the rifleman fires from a distances of 150 paces with all certainty, the musket however only up to 80 paces, the riflemen will not suffer much from the muskets, while they themselves will be able to do great harm to the enemy. The principle when using riflemen should therefore be to keep the enemy at a distance, where they themselves will fire with certainty, the enemy with uncertainty.

Sending the riflemen therefore always forward, storming and attacking villages occupied by the enemy, is therefore a totally inexpedient use of this arm. One should post them inside forests, or let them advance within these, place them in defensive positions in ditches, behind walls, single trees, fences, walls, etc. Or order them to accompany the enemy at the range of their weapon when he advances, while our infantry prepares to attack them – and the service they will do will never be in doubt.

6) War as a whole, especially the outcome of a fight, will depend on superiority, on utilising overpowering force at a certain point.

7) To be able to gain such superiority of forces, it is necessary to deceive the enemy about the real point of attack, and to execute a false and a real attack. For the false attack, smaller forces will be used then for the real one.

8) Both attacks have to be masked by skirmishers, so that it becomes difficult for the enemy to distinguish the real attack from the false one.

9) A skirmisher line should advance, and the enemies attention should be drawn to one of its wings by several battalions, destined for skirmishing, a wing that at the same time should be heavily cannonaded.

This is the beginning of the combat.

10) While this happens, the real attack should be held back, and should only be launched when we have succeeded in drawing the enemies attention completely to the false point of attack.

11) The real attack should now be executed as quickly and fiercely as possible, especially by an overwhelming superior force of artillery- and infantry-masses. When possible, at the same time this flank would be turned by a separate corps.

12) When this all should be arranged, the artillery and cavalry should be held together on the day of battle. More then I have noticed, is happening until now. Ten to twelve cannon at a certain spot will decide nothing, however 80 – 100 cannon will be sufficient to draw the attention of the enemy to a certain spot for a while.

13) Now, the division of forces for the day of battle will be made. To give an example, we assume that we have a corps consisting of four brigades and a hundred cannon; one brigade will be assigned to execute the false attack, another one will be in reserve, while two will execute the main attack. The artillery is divided as follows:

20 pieces for the false attack,

40 pieces for the real attack,

40 pieces with the reserve.

The cavalry will be kept back from the fighting, and will not appear before the decision has fallen, and will go over to the pursuit or retreat. – Now begins the attack; first, the brigade making the false attack will advance. It dispatches a third of its men forward to skirmish and twelve cannon start a fierce cannonade; 2/3 of its men and eight guns will stay further back, to feed the combat and as supports, and to relieve the battalions. The brigadier positions his forces in such a way, that the enemy cannot define his strength.

14) The fighting will last this way for a while, until he has send reinforcements to this wing. The remaining part of the troops will be kept out of range, and whenever possible also out of sight of the enemy, even if this will be the case for one or more hours. While this happens, the commander reconnoitres the point of the real attack, using as much cover as possible, making his dispositions.

15) When the enemy has send more troops against the false attack, which should be maintained for about one hour more with raising fierceness, the real attack will be launched suddenly and brusque. The 40 pieces of artillery will be deployed in such a way, that they are able to fire at the chosen point, were the decision will fall, with concentric shots. Their volleys will be fired at a quick succession, and their howitzers will be concentrated in one position; the battalion-columns of the enemy will be treated first, and all 40 pieces will fire at one battalion at the same time, and so they will treat one battalion after the other.

The cannonade will last as long until the infantry attack has been prepared. One brigade will make the turning movement, the other the attack en fronte; the latter will not start before the first will have executed the turning movement.

Now both brigades together will attack, every one with half of its troops in Geschwindschritt, in accordance to all principles of the so-called brigade-disposition, without firing much, when it is infantry against infantry.

16) A village or forest on the contrary will be set to fire or fired at with howitzers, and the infantry will not come close or enter until the enemy has abandoned it.

17) If the attack succeeds, the other halves of the brigades, which have been held out of the fire, will follow up quickly; one should not give the enemy time to come to his senses, and the cavalry assigned to these brigades will support them; the reserve shall advance to be at hand.

18) If one encounters heavy resistance, one should advance ½ of the reserve with some batteries; the cavalry reserve still has to be held back, or should execute a wide turning movement so that it would be able to appear in the enemies back unexpectedly. It should not charge before the enemy shows his cavalry, or before disorder is already complete. These simple principles would suffice for all days of battle in case of an attack.

19) One should not show his troops as well as his artillery to the enemy. Everything should remain under cover, if possible 2/3 in reserve; a part completely goes back, to serve for a wide turning movement or totally unexpected events.

20) One should double guile and deceive, for example by hidden batteries, which are not unmasked before the enemy is within canister range; feinted retreats of a force, to lure the enemy into an ambush; a wing seemingly hanging in the air, behind which are huge masses hidden and en colonne; here the enemy will believe that he could turn us with advantage, and during his attack one would launch his own attack unexpectedly, falling on his flank with a part, not giving him a chance to regain his senses again. Also in defence, victory would not lack us with the glorious bravery of the troops executing it. All these are sentences often said and known to you. We have practised this often during our peace time manoeuvres, but I repeat them to you, then the known is often forgotten. While it seems daily business because of its simplicity, but victory depends on it.

Without knowing, and without repeating it every day, one will easily fall back on ingenious dispositions. Or, even worse, one goes into combat without dispositions at all.

The experiences you all had, will have shown you the necessity not to disdain what has proved itself to us.”

Neudorf, 10 August 1813

(signed) Friedrich Wilhelm

Source: Anonymous, “Gefechts-Instruction, für die kommandirende Generale, Brigade-Chefs und Kommandeurs der preuβischen Armee nach dem Waffenstilstand 1813”, in ‘Militair-Wochenblatt’ No. 9 (2 March 1844) pp. 35-36, and No. 10 (9 March 1844) pp. 39-40.

Further reading about this subject: Jeff Lewis, “Regulating Battalions – The Prussian Way!” in ‘First Empire’ No. 78 (September / October 2004) pp. 8-10.

© Geert van Uythoven